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Abstract
This paper analyses the pattern of income support penalties 
applied to people participating in remote employment services 
from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2018. Between 30 000 and 37 000 
unemployed Australians were participating in these services at any 
given time during this period. More than 80% were identified as 
Indigenous. Although remote program participants were covered 
by the same social security rules as those in nonremote areas, the 
programs that they participated in imposed different obligations 
on them and included different incentives for providers. These 
differences were justified by government officials on the basis 
that they were tailored to the unique circumstances of remote 
communities. The paper describes how the combination of more 
stringent obligations and inadequate protections for vulnerable 
people have contributed to a substantial escalation in penalties. 
Despite this, there is no sign that the participation of remote 
Indigenous people in employment services is increasing. In fact, 
there is evidence that many are rejecting the program.
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Introduction
This paper analyses the pattern of income support 
penalties applied to people participating in remote 
employment services from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 
2018. During this period, between 30 000 and 
37 000 unemployed Australians were participating in 
these services at any given time. More than 80% of 
participants were identified as Indigenous.1 Although 
remote program participants were covered by the same 
social security rules as those in nonremote areas, the 
programs that they participated in imposed different 
obligations on them and included different incentives 
for providers. These differences were justified by 
government officials on the basis that they were tailored 
to the unique circumstances of remote communities.
The separation of remote employment services from 
mainstream programs from mid-2013 has made 
it possible to use publicly available information to 
compare income support penalties between remote and 
nonremote areas, and to track the impact of program 
changes during the study period (see also Fowkes 2016, 
Fowkes & Sanders 2016). Because of the number of 
Indigenous jobseekers living in remote areas, trends in 
remote income support penalties show up in the national 
distribution of penalties between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous unemployed people. The picture that has 
emerged from analysis of recent trends in penalties 
is stark. Over five years from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 
2018, the small group of unemployed people living in 
remote areas – comprising fewer than one-twentieth of 
all unemployment benefit recipients – received more 
penalties than all of their nonremote counterparts 
combined. More than 90% of remote participants who 
were penalised were identified as Indigenous, driving 
the level of penalties applied to Indigenous people to an 
unprecedented high. This paper uses publicly available 
data to describe these patterns and to provide insights 
into their causes and effects, updating the findings 
of two earlier CAEPR Working Papers (Fowkes 2016, 
Fowkes & Sanders 2016).
The paper is arranged in six sections. Section 1 
provides an overview of conditionality as applied to 
working-age income support payments in Australia, 
and the particular issues that have emerged in the 
application of conditional payments to Indigenous 
Australians living in remote areas. Section 2 outlines the 
employment program and compliance arrangements 
in place during the period covered in the paper (1 July 
2013 – 30 June 2018). Analysis of the number and 
pattern of penalties is set out in Section 3. Section 4 
considers claims that there have been changes in 
attitude and behaviour as a result of conditions applied 
to payments. Section 5 comments on recent changes 
in the legal framework for penalties. Section 6 provides 
some concluding reflections.
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1 ‘Activating’ jobseekers 
through income support 
conditionality
1.1 Development and implementation 
of welfare conditionality
From the establishment of unemployment benefits 
in Australia in 1945, receipt has been conditional on 
availability for, and willingness to accept, suitable work 
(the ‘work test’). In Australia, as in other countries 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the obligations of working-age 
income support recipients have been extended and 
intensified over the past three decades as governments 
have shifted their focus from attempting to address 
unemployment directly to ‘activating’ the unemployed 
(Harris 2001, Martin 2015). In 1991, the work test became 
an ‘activity test’, allowing the imposition of obligations 
designed to both ‘hassle’ and ‘help’ unemployed people 
to find work (Mead 1997, Dean 1998, Carney & Ramia 
1999). Under the activity test, most unemployed people 
(‘jobseekers’) are required to conduct a specified 
number of job searches each month, to attend regular 
appointments with an employment service provider, 
to engage in work preparation activities and, in some 
cases, to participate in Work for the Dole2 (Davidson & 
Whiteford 2012). The intensification of the obligations 
of income support recipients has coincided with the 
expansion of the range of income support recipients 
subject to activity testing. During the past 25 years, 
many more partnered and sole parents, people with 
disabilities, and older unemployed people have become 
subject to income support obligations (Davidson & 
Whiteford 2012:39–40, OECD 2012).
The move to ‘activation’ as the basis for unemployment 
assistance has been accompanied by a transformation 
in administration. The rights and obligations of income 
support recipients are now mediated through a 
complex set of contractual relationships and nonlegal 
‘agreements’ between policy agencies, service 
providers and unemployed individuals (Carney & Ramia 
1999). Income support payments are administered 
by the Australian Government Department of Human 
Services (DHS),3 which operates under service 
agreements with policy departments, particularly the 
Australian Government Department of Jobs and Small 
Business4 (Davidson & Whiteford 2012). Provision 
of employment services has been fully privatised. 
Services are now delivered by a range of nonprofit and 
for-profit providers that are bound by detailed funding 
agreements and guidelines, while competing within 
‘quasi-market’ arrangements (Considine et al. 2011). 
Jobseekers are affected by, but are not parties to, these 
service agreements and contractual arrangements. Their 
obligations are set out in individual agreements with 
employment service providers (‘job plans’). Although 
couched in contractual language, these agreements 
are ultimately one-sided (Carney & Ramia 1999). An 
unemployed person who fails to enter into an agreement 
can have their benefits suspended or withdrawn, while 
many of the obligations contained in ‘individual’ plans 
are prescribed by the government through its contracts 
with providers (Australian Government 2018:s.3.2.8.30). 
Individuals have the ability to complain about a provider 
to the government ‘purchaser’ of the services, but their 
capacity to challenge the appropriateness or equity of 
obligations imposed is highly constrained (Carney & 
Ramia 1999).
Unlike many of the obligations included in job plans, 
arrangements for application of penalties are set out in 
legislation (see Table A in Appendix). The Social Security 
(Administration) Act 1999 sets out the circumstances 
in which payments may be suspended, reduced or 
cancelled; the level of penalty to be applied; and the 
procedural and appeal rights of those affected. Other 
matters, such as what types of ‘excuse’ might be 
accepted for nonattendance, are set out in regulations. 
These compliance arrangements have been the 
subject of frequent change over the past two decades, 
including major restructuring in 1999, 2006, 2009 and 
2017 (Davidson & Whiteford 2012:35–38). The penalty 
regime, once a relatively marginal feature of the social 
security system, is now seen as a critical tool for moving 
unemployed people off payments and into work (OECD 
2001, Martin 2015). Trends in the application of social 
security penalties are also a measurable and visible 
sign of the ‘hard edge’ of activation, and have been 
used by welfare advocates to challenge government 
policies (Eardley et al. 2005, Davidson & Whiteford 
2012). Because of the potential political sensitivity of 
penalties, the enthusiasm of elected officials to punish 
those ‘wilfully’ flouting the system has been tempered 
by efforts to show that those considered ‘vulnerable’ 
are being protected (Disney et al. 2010, Davidson 
& Whiteford 2012:35–38, Australian Government 
2018:s.3.1.14). These efforts to balance punishment and 
protection have frequently resulted in changes to the 
level of discretion available to frontline workers (Disney 
et al. 2010, Considine et al. 2014). Increased availability 
of frontline discretion has not, however, always led to 
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reduced penalties (Considine et al. 2014). Wider trends, 
such as declining skills of frontline workers, increased 
caseloads, competitive pressures and converging 
organisational strategies, have been associated with 
increasing use of sanctions by frontline workers, 
regardless of the compliance regime (Considine et al. 
2014, Lewis et al. 2016).
1.2 Application of ‘mainstream’ income 
support conditions to remote 
Indigenous Australians
Indigenous Australians have been subject to the same 
legislative framework for provision of unemployment 
benefits as other Australians since 1966. Even 
so, particularly in remote areas, there have been 
considerable differences in the practical application of 
these rules to them. Until the mid-1970s, government 
officials considered many Indigenous people living on 
missions and government settlements ineligible for 
unemployment benefits because they were judged, 
by virtue of where they lived, to be ‘unavailable for 
work’ – therefore unable to meet the work test (Sanders 
1985). The Whitlam government reversed this policy, 
but officials remained concerned about how they 
might apply the work test in places where little or no 
suitable work was likely to become available (Sanders 
2012). One early response was the development of the 
Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) 
scheme, which allowed some Indigenous people to 
work part-time for wages on community projects instead 
of accessing the mainstream income support system 
(Sanders 2012, Jordan 2016). The CDEP scheme was 
established as a pilot in 1977. By 1997, it employed more 
than 20 000 Indigenous people in remote communities 
(Antonios 1997:8). As the obligations of unemployment 
benefit recipients intensified through the 1990s, 
government officials also developed and formalised a 
practice of applying exemptions from the activity test 
to those considered to have no practical access to the 
labour market or to employment programs (remote area 
exemptions [RAEs]) (Sanders 1999). Until the mid-2000s, 
the combined effect of the availability of CDEP and 
RAEs limited the effects of the intensification of income 
support conditionality on Indigenous people in remote 
areas. But the resurgence of paternalism and the move 
away from self-determination as a ‘dominant principle’ in 
Indigenous affairs marked the end of these ‘adaptations’ 
(Sanders 2012). By 2009, all RAEs had been removed, 
and CDEP wages had ended for all new entrants to the 
scheme. Indigenous Australians in remote Australia 
were drawn into the mainstream ‘active’ systems of 
employment assistance and conditional payments. 
Moreover, remote Indigenous communities became 
the target of new experiments in welfare conditionality 
through new types of restrictions on spending and 
access to cash (Cox 2011, Klein & Razi 2018).
Even before the removal of RAEs and the closure of 
CDEP, there was evidence that Indigenous people 
were more likely to receive income support penalties 
than others (Sanders 1999, Eardley et al. 2005, Disney 
et al. 2010). In 2009, as these adaptations were closed 
off, a new Job Seeker Compliance Framework was 
implemented through the Social Security Legislation 
Amendment (Employment Services Reform) Act 
2009. Although some amendments were made to this 
framework over time, its overall structure remained in 
place until 30 June 2018 (see Section 5). The 2009 Job 
Seeker Compliance Framework was developed in the 
context of the inclusion of more disadvantaged groups 
in employment programs (Disney et al. 2010). It was 
intended to give contracted providers the flexibility 
to engage unemployed people using nonpunitive 
approaches, and to protect those identified as 
vulnerable from being penalised for matters outside their 
control (Disney et al. 2010) (see further Section 2.3). But 
the 2009 framework did not specifically address the 
situation of remote Indigenous Australians.
In 2010, the independent review of the Job Seeker 
Compliance Framework raised concerns about the 
likely effectiveness of the framework’s protections for 
remote Indigenous people (Disney et al. 2010:71–74). 
Identification of ‘vulnerabilities’ relied heavily on the 
willingness of jobseekers to disclose issues to DHS 
officials and their ability to provide documentation to 
support their claims. But access to health and other 
services in remote communities was limited, and DHS 
reliance on phone interviews undermined the quality 
of assessments (Disney et al. 2010:73). The review 
recommended that the government establish a specific 
review process to examine and address the application 
of the framework in remote communities, but this did 
not occur.
A 2012 government evaluation of the experience 
of Indigenous jobseekers in employment services 
appeared to confirm that protections were not working 
(DEEWR 2012). It noted that remote Indigenous 
Australians were less likely than others to be assessed 
by DHS officials as having significant participation 
obstacles, despite the prevalence of health and other 
challenges to participation known to exist in this 
population (DEEWR 2012). Overall engagement with 
caepr.cass.anu.edu.au
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the system by Indigenous Australians was poor. While 
identifying these limitations, the report deferred to the 
review of remote employment services arrangements 
that was then under way to come up with a better 
approach (DEEWR 2012:33–34). It was this review 
that led to the establishment of a separate remote 
employment program from 1 July 2013.
2 Job Seeker Compliance 
Framework and remote 
program obligations 
2013–18
2.1 Remote Jobs and Communities 
Program
On 1 July 2013, the Remote Jobs and Communities 
Program (RJCP) was established to deliver employment 
services to all activity-tested income support recipients 
across remote Australia (see Figure 1). The program 
initially had around 36 000 participants, of whom 83% 
were identified as Indigenous. This represented around 
28% of the Indigenous population in employment 
services Australia-wide (Forrest 2014:150). RJCP had 
many similarities to Job Services Australia (JSA) – the 
principal labour market program then operating in 
nonremote areas. As in JSA, RJCP participants had 
to attend mandatory case management appointments 
and enter into individualised job plans. RJCP providers 
were required to include in job plans activities that 
helped prepare clients for work. However, the program 
guidelines for RJCP set ‘expected’ weekly hours of 
activity for participants that were higher than those 
expected in JSA and extended over more of the year 
(Fowkes & Sanders 2016:6). For example, those in 
RJCP with full-time work capacity were expected to 
undertake activities for around 40 hours per fortnight 
throughout the year, whereas annual activity obligations 
for most JSA participants started after a year, lasted 
for six months in each year and generally involved no 
more than 30 hours per fortnight (Fowkes & Sanders 
2016). The imposition of more onerous activity 
requirements in remote areas appeared to have its 
basis in a recognition that many people would not be 
able to find work. The government stated its ‘belief’ 
that – in the absence of work – remote unemployed 
people should be ‘participating in meaningful activities 
that contribute to the strength and sustainability of 
their community’ (Macklin et al. 2012:4). But providers 
still had considerable flexibility in the type of activity 
to which they could refer people, and in the intensity 
of monitoring and enforcement of obligations, so the 
initial effect of higher hours on income support penalties 
was (relative to later developments) somewhat muted 
(Fowkes & Sanders 2016).
2.2 Work for the Dole and the 
Community Development Program
A change of government in September 2013 led to 
further intensification of obligations under the remote 
scheme. Policy development and contract management 
became the responsibility of the newly formed 
Indigenous Affairs Group in the Australian Government 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C). 
In 2014, the Australian Minister for Indigenous Affairs, 
Northern Territory Senator Nigel Scullion, directed 
that more of those in RJCP be placed in ‘structured 
activities’ – where hours were continually monitored 
and supervised, and where nonattendance had to 
be promptly reported. Then, from 1 July 2015, the 
government made a more substantial set of changes 
to the remote program, the centrepiece of which was 
to require participants with full-time work capacity to 
attend Work for the Dole Monday to Friday throughout 
the year (see Table 1). The program was also renamed 
the Community Development Program (CDP). This 
change coincided with the replacement of JSA with the 
jobactive program in nonremote areas.5
To ensure that CDP providers applied attendance rules 
strictly, service fees associated with jobseekers who 
had Work for the Dole obligations were linked to their 
attendance. Providers could only receive payment for 
those who failed to attend Work for the Dole where the 
jobseeker had provided an excuse or where the provider 
recommended to DHS that a penalty be applied to 
them. As a result, reporting of noncompliance under the 
remote scheme dramatically increased (Fowkes 2016).
2.3 Operation of the Job Seeker 
Compliance Framework
Despite some attempts to establish separate rules 
for remote areas,6 participants in remote employment 
services remained under the same compliance 
framework as their nonremote counterparts until 
1 July 2018. Collectively, these rules were known 
as the Job Seeker Compliance Framework, the key 
elements of which had been established in 2009. 
Within this framework, the monitoring of obligations 
4  Fowkes
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was shared by employment services providers and 
DHS, but only DHS could determine that a penalty 
should apply. Where a jobseeker failed to comply 
with the obligations in their job plan (e.g. by failing to 
attend Work for the Dole), providers were required to 
decide whether the person had a ‘reasonable excuse’ 
and, if no reasonable excuse existed, could submit 
a ‘participation report’ recommending to DHS that a 
penalty be applied. According to government guidelines, 
the recommendation ‘depends on what the provider 
thinks is the most appropriate strategy to re-engage 
the jobseeker’ (Department of Employment 2016). Upon 
receiving the provider report, DHS investigated the 
‘failure’ and applied a penalty if it determined that the 
relevant conditions for its application had been met. 
Both providers and DHS were required to consider the 
vulnerabilities of jobseekers (indicated by a ‘vulnerability 
indicator’ on the jobseeker record) in assessing the 
appropriateness of penalties. Vulnerabilities could 
include factors such as cognitive impairment, mental or 
other health problems, personal crisis, homelessness, 
and lack of understanding of program requirements. 
However, no special training or qualifications were 
required of frontline staff considering the impact of 
these vulnerabilities on compliance.
The Job Seeker Compliance Framework contained two 
types of penalty: short penalties, which meant the loss 
of one-tenth of fortnightly income support; and penalties 
for ‘serious failures’, which meant loss of eight weeks of 
payment. Serious penalties could be waived in cases of 
financial hardship or if participants agreed to participate 
in a ‘compliance activity’ (such as Work for the Dole), 
usually 25 hours per week. In addition to penalties, the 
framework allowed for payments to be suspended until 
a participant re-engaged with the provider or DHS, at 
which point payments were backpaid.7
Short penalties usually applied when a person had failed 
to attend an appointment or an activity. They could also 
be applied when a jobseeker refused to enter into a job 
plan. Serious (eight-week) failures could be applied in 
cases of work refusal or ‘voluntary unemployment’. They 
Figure 1 Coverage of remote employment services, 2013–present
Source: PM&C (2018a)
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Table 1 Comparison of obligations and reporting arrangements: jobactive and Community 
Development Program
Mutual obligation requirements compared
Obligation Jobactive Community Development Programa
Appointments Monthly Monthly
Job search Generally 20 per month, but in the most 
disadvantaged stream this depends on 
capacity.
Determined by provider. Minimum 1 per month, 
maximum 20 per month.
Duration of 
requirement
‘Annual activity requirement’ starts 12 months 
after starting in the program.
The requirement is for 6 continuous months of 
activity in each year of unemployment.
Work for the Dole starts immediately for those 
with mandatory obligation (see below) and 
continues until the participant leaves income 
support or their circumstances change. 
Providers can give participants up to 6 weeks 
time off in any 12-month period (i.e. minimum 
requirement of 46 weeks per year).
Hours of 
work required 
(people with 
full-time work 
capacity)
Aged under 30 years: 50 hours per fortnight for 
26 weeks each year = 650 hours per year.
Aged 30–59: 30 hours per fortnight for 
26 weeks each year = 390 hours per year 
(increased to 650 hours per year for those 
aged 30–49 from September 2018).
In addition, job search and appointments. 
Aged 18–49: 25 hours per week in Work for the 
Dole activities (at least 1150 hours per year).
Aged 50–54: 25 hours per week mutual 
obligation activities (at least 1150 hours per 
year).
Aged 55+: 30 hours per fortnight mutual 
obligation activities (at least 690 hours per 
year).
In addition, job search and appointments. 
Hours of 
work required 
(people with 
part-time 
work capacity; 
i.e. principal 
carers, people 
with disabilities)
Aged under 30 years: 390 hours per year 
over 26 weeks = 30 hours per fortnight over 
26 weeks.
Aged 30–59: 200 hours per year over 26 weeks 
(15–16 hours per fortnight) (increased for those 
aged 30–49 years from September 2018).
(Or up to minimum assessed work capacity.)
In addition, appointments and job search 
where appropriate.
At least 30 hours per fortnight of activities = 
approximately 690 hours per year, or up to 
minimum assessed work capacity.
In addition, appointments and job search where 
appropriate.
6  Fowkes
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Mutual obligation requirements compared
Obligation Jobactive Community Development Programa
Types of 
activity
The annual activity requirement is able to be 
met through:
• Work for the Dole
• National Work Experience Programme 
(up to 4 weeks)
• voluntary work
• part-time work
• study or training at Cert 3 level or higher
• defence reserves
• other approved government or 
nongovernment programs
• drug and alcohol treatment (from 
1 January 2018).
With some exceptions, activities cannot 
be conducted on private property or in 
commercial enterprises. They cannot involve 
work that would have been done by a paid 
worker had the Work for the Dole activity not 
taken place, or reduce hours of existing paid 
workers, or perform tasks done by workers 
made redundant in the last 12 months. 
Work for the Dole is compulsory for all 
participants aged 18–49 with full-time capacity.
Hours in part-time work can be counted 
towards the 25-hour per week requirement. 
Training can only be counted if it is necessary 
for the Work for the Dole project or is linked to 
a job.
The guidelines allow for most of the 25 hours 
to be spent in a service (e.g. rehabilitation) 
‘where there is a clear need’, but in these cases 
records of attendance must still be kept.
Participants with part-time work capacity or 
50 years+ can participate in a range of activities 
as per jobactive.
Scheduling Flexible Activities must be scheduled so that they ‘set 
a daily routine for jobseekers across a five-
day, Monday-to-Friday week’. Providers may 
put forward a proposal for different scheduling 
under ‘special circumstances’. 
Monitoring and 
reporting
In Work for the Dole, attendance for each 
day must be recorded, and submitted within 
10 days.
For other activities, attendance is recorded 
monthly. 
Work for the Dole: Attendance must be 
recorded for each day and entered into the 
IT system. Monthly payments are based on 
records in this system.
Payments are not made where a person has 
not attended Work for the Dole and the provider 
has not reported noncompliance to DHS.
DHS = Australian Government Department of Human Services
a Before 1 March 2019
Table 1 continued
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could also be applied when a jobseeker was found to be 
‘persistently noncompliant’ with program requirements. 
Following the application of three short penalties in 
a six-month period, jobseekers were automatically 
referred to DHS for consideration as to whether a 
persistent noncompliance penalty should be applied. 
Before making this decision, specialist DHS workers 
conducted Comprehensive Compliance Assessments 
(CCAs) to determine whether the previous ‘failures’ had 
been committed ‘intentionally, recklessly or negligently’.8 
DHS officers could refer jobseekers for a work capacity 
assessment, suggest additional support that should 
be provided, or decline to apply a serious failure on the 
basis that noncompliance was not within the jobseeker’s 
control. But, as the independent panel noted in 2010, 
the process was heavily reliant on the availability of 
evidence about jobseeker vulnerabilities and the quality 
of DHS assessment processes (Disney et al. 2010).
By 2016, it was clear that, despite the various checks 
and protections in the Job Seeker Compliance 
Framework, Indigenous people in remote areas were 
receiving a disproportionate number of penalties 
(Fowkes 2016, Fowkes & Sanders 2016). Government 
officials defended the remote program against critics 
by referring to the availability of waivers for serious 
failures and legal protections for vulnerable people 
(e.g. Browning 2016, PM&C 2017b:8–10). In addition, 
they argued, the application of penalties was essential 
to putting an end to ‘passive welfare’. According to the 
Indigenous Affairs Minister:
… a breach isn’t there to be mean, a breach is 
there to create an incentive to actually turn up to 
an activity and we can put purpose in your life. 
(Nigel Scullion in Browning 2016)
3 Penalties applied to remote 
employment program 
participants, 1 July 
2013 – 30 June 2018
3.1 Available information about income 
support penalties
Since March 2008, the Australian Government has 
published quarterly information about the number 
of penalties applied to income support recipients 
by Indigenous status and, from September 2009, 
by employment services program.9 The data have a 
number of limitations: data are presented separately 
by Indigenous status and by program, but there is 
no breakdown within these categories (e.g. number 
of Indigenous people penalised within a program); 
numbers of penalties are reported rather than numbers 
of individuals penalised; and information is not provided 
about the number of jobseekers who participated in 
each program during each quarter, making it difficult 
to calculate a penalty ‘rate’ (cf. Sanders 1999, Eardley 
et al. 2005). This paper attempts to overcome these 
limitations by using separate ‘point in time’ caseload 
data for different programs, allowing an (imperfect) 
perspective on relative breaching rates. In addition, 
regular quarterly jobseeker compliance data have been 
supplemented by government information that has 
emerged from other sources, particularly responses to 
questions asked during Senate Estimates. This paper 
also draws on surveys, interviews and observations 
undertaken in the course of a larger study of the delivery 
of remote employment services to provide insights into 
the factors influencing penalties.
3.2 Number and pattern of penalties 
applied to remote jobseekers 
compared
In September 2017, there were 32 629 participants 
in CDP, of whom 82.5% identified as Indigenous.10 
There were, at the same time, 714 463 participants 
in the nonremote jobactive program, of whom 10.5% 
identified as Indigenous.11 Another 190 589 people 
(5.7% Indigenous) in nonremote areas participated in 
specialist Disability Employment Services.12 While the 
sizes of these programs fluctuated over time, the remote 
program accounted for less than one-twentieth (<5%) 
of activity-tested jobseekers over the period covered 
by this analysis – 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2018 – but 
accounted for 38.8% of all penalties (Figure 2).
The rate and pattern of penalties changed significantly 
over time (Figure 3). Participants in the first iteration 
of the remote program – RJCP (1 July 2013 – 30 June 
2015) – received 9.2% of all financial penalties. Under 
CDP, this increased to 53.3% of all financial penalties 
from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2018. From the start of CDP 
to June 2018, CDP participants received more than 
half a million penalties (559 298), pushing penalties to a 
historical high nationally.13
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For simplicity, most of the analysis in this paper focuses 
on comparison of penalties applied to participants in the 
two mainstream nonspecialist labour market programs 
(JSA and jobactive) with those applied to participants 
in the remote programs (RJCP and CDP). Together, 
these four programs accounted for 95.7% of all income 
support penalties applied during the included period.
As shown at Figure 3, penalties applied under the 
JSA program sharply declined after September 2014 
and increased again following the implementation of 
jobactive (from the quarter ending September 2015). 
The disruption caused by the transition from JSA to 
jobactive, which involved a change in providers and 
transfer of jobseekers, caused a temporary decline in 
penalties. The change from RJCP to CDP was given 
effect through an amendment to existing contracts 
rather than a new program, so there was no similar 
disruption to penalties.14
In addition to the temporary reduction in penalties 
associated with the move from JSA to jobactive, a 
longer-term decline occurred in mainstream penalties 
because of a change in compliance procedures applied 
to those who failed to attend appointments.15 From 
July 2014, unemployed people who failed to attend 
provider appointments had their payments suspended in 
the first instance rather than having a penalty applied.16 
Those with mobile phones were notified immediately 
of the suspension by text, and could restart payments 
by engaging directly with their provider (rather than 
DHS). This change substantially reduced the number of 
‘appointment related’ failures, and, as a result, reduced 
numbers of ‘persistent noncompliance’ penalties 
(Figure 4). Appointment-related failures also dropped in 
remote areas in response to the change (see Figure 4), 
but the impact of this reduction was small relative to 
the dramatic escalation in ‘no show no pay’ penalties 
applied for nonattendance at Work for the Dole from 
2015. Appointment-related failures accounted for 
a smaller proportion of penalties under the remote 
program, even before the introduction of CDP (Figure 4). 
It might have been possible to implement a similar 
‘suspend first’ arrangement for Work for the Dole at the 
time of the change to appointment arrangements, but 
this did not occur. Penalties, rather than suspensions, 
remained the primary approach to those who failed 
to attend Work for the Dole, so the benefits to remote 
unemployed people of the 2014 change were limited.
Figure 2 Comparison of caseload and penalties by program
DES jobactive CDP OtherDES JSA/jobactive RJCP/CDP
Caseload by program, September 2017 Penalties by program,  July 2013 – June 2018 
CDP = Community Development Program; DES = Disability Employment Services; JSA = Job Services Australia; RJCP = Remote Jobs 
and Communities Program
Sources: Department of Jobs and Small Business, Senate Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee – see endnotes 10–12
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Figure 3 Number of quarterly financial penalties by program, quarters ending September 2013 – 
June 2018
Not in employment servicesDisability Employment ServicesJSA/jobactiveRJCP/CDP
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Figure 4 Number of penalties by category, 1 July 2013 – 1 July 2017
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3.3 No show no pay penalties: the 
effect of Work for the Dole
Of the 606 498 penalties applied to remote program 
participants between 1 July 2013 and June 2018, 
499 690 (82.4%) were applied for nonattendance at an 
activity (no show no pay penalties). The vast majority of 
these penalties (94.4%) were applied after 1 July 2015, 
following the introduction of more stringent Work for 
the Dole arrangements under CDP. In every subsequent 
quarter, remote program participants received more 
no show no pay penalties than their nonremote 
counterparts in jobactive, despite the CDP caseload 
being a fraction (one-twentieth) of the size (Figure 5).
There was an increased emphasis on Work for the 
Dole in nonremote areas under jobactive, but the 
specific arrangements were quite different from those 
in CDP. Nonremote jobseekers could only be referred 
to Work for the Dole after a year of employment 
assistance rather than straight away, as under CDP. 
Nearly 80% of jobactive jobseekers left the program 
before they reached this point.17 Most remaining 
jobactive participants chose to meet their obligation 
through something other than Work for the Dole. 
In the year ending August 2017, for example, only 
26.5% of jobactive participants with an annual activity 
requirement were placed in Work for the Dole; most of 
the rest chose part-time work or training.18 In contrast, 
at 29 September 2017, more than 75% of all CDP 
participants were in Work for the Dole.19 Under CDP 
guidelines, participants aged 18–49 had no option but 
to fulfil their obligations through Work for the Dole, while 
many older participants who were entitled to choose 
other options were placed in Work for the Dole for lack 
of practical alternatives.
One of the implications of higher rates of placement of 
remote unemployed people in Work for the Dole was 
that this group was subjected to closer surveillance. 
Only Work for the Dole required daily submission of 
attendance reports by providers – other activities 
were monitored monthly (see Table 1). In addition, only 
CDP participants were made to work their activity 
hours over five days in each week. They had more 
‘opportunities to fail’. Within the Job Seeker Compliance 
Framework, providers in both programs could decide 
whether or not to recommend a penalty, but only CDP 
providers were financially penalised for using this 
discretion. In 2016, 111 086 jobactive participants took 
part in Work for the Dole, attracting 103 533 no show 
no pay penalties in that year – an average of about 
0.9 penalties per participant.20 An estimated 30 000 
CDP participants participated in Work for the Dole in 
Figure 5 Comparison of the number of no show no pay penalties, quarters ending September 
2013 – June 2018
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that year, yet they received 161 507 no show no pay 
penalties – an average of more than 5 penalties per 
participant.21 The combination of more hours, less 
flexibility and greater surveillance meant that a greater 
proportion of remote participants became subject to 
Work for the Dole–related penalties, and they received 
them around 5.5 times more often.
3.4 Comprehensive Compliance 
Assessments and penalties for 
persistent noncompliance
One of the consequences of a higher rate of short 
penalties applied to remote participants was their 
increased exposure to serious penalties for persistent 
noncompliance. These penalties meant up to eight 
weeks without income support, although most people 
opted to access a waiver by starting a compliance 
activity before the eight-week period ended.22 Between 
1 July 2015 and 30 June 2018, CDP participants 
received 82 139 persistent noncompliance penalties, 
nearly 4.5 times the number applied to participants in 
the much larger jobactive program (18 531) (Figure 6). 
The remote program’s share of these penalties rose 
from a quarterly average of 17% under RJCP to 80% 
under CDP.
Because referral for determination of a persistent 
noncompliance penalty was automatic following three 
short penalties, the increase in no show no pay penalties 
flowed into an increase in referrals to DHS to consider 
whether a serious penalty should apply (Figure 7). 
However, as can be seen in Figure 7, the increase in 
penalties applied exceeded the increase in referrals. In 
other words, having being referred, remote participants 
were more likely to be found by DHS to be ‘wilfully’ and 
‘persistently’ noncompliant.
Adverse CCA outcome rates between CDP participants 
and others are compared in Figure 8. Whereas 
53.8% of CDP participants referred for a CCA were 
assessed by DHS as intentionally, wilfully or negligently 
noncompliant, only 24.4% of participants in other 
programs received this result (Figure 8). Similarly, at a 
national level, Indigenous jobseekers were much more 
likely to receive a penalty following an assessment of 
their ability to comply.
The CCA process had been established to ensure that 
penalties would be applied only where compliance 
failures were intentional, reckless or negligent and 
did not arise from a jobseeker’s vulnerability. But 
despite the disproportionate burden of ill health, 
disability, psychological distress and poor living 
conditions experienced by many in remote Indigenous 
Figure 6 Comparison of serious penalties applied for persistent noncompliance, quarters ending 
September 2013 – June 2018
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Figure 7 Remote participants as a percentage of Comprehensive Compliance Assessments and 
adverse outcomes, quarters ending September 2013 – June 2018
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Figure 8 Comparison of negative Comprehensive Compliance Assessment outcomes, by program 
and by Indigenous status, 1 July 2015 – 30 June 2018
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communities, when they conducted CCAs, DHS staff 
were less likely to identify noncompliance as arising 
from vulnerabilities in this population than when 
they assessed other jobseekers. The rate of medical 
exemptions for unemployed people in CDP areas (5%) 
was half that of those in nonremote areas (10%), and 
lower again for Indigenous people in these areas (3%) 
(PM&C 2018b:26). Penalties were more likely to be 
applied to those who had been unemployed longer, had 
poorer English, and lacked access to communications 
or transport (PM&C 2018b:40). The prediction of the 
Independent Review Panel that protections for the 
vulnerable might not help Indigenous people in remote 
areas appears to have been borne out.
When questioned about the greater frequency of its 
application of serious penalties to Indigenous people, 
DHS advised a Senate committee that it applies policy 
‘in the same way’ to all jobseekers and that:
A Comprehensive Compliance Assessment 
is more likely to find noncompliance to be 
sustained (i.e. ‘persistent’) and ‘deliberate’ 
where a participant has had previous multiple 
Comprehensive Compliance Assessments.23
This suggests that, rather than additional CCAs 
increasing the likelihood that underlying problems 
might be uncovered, any earlier failures to identify 
vulnerabilities were likely to be compounded.
Data provided to a Senate committee in 2017 provided 
a more detailed picture of the distribution of serious 
penalties within CDP, including by Indigenous status 
(Table 2). They showed that, during the first two years 
of CDP, 15 127 individuals received ‘serious penalties’, 
of whom 92.3% were Indigenous (compared with 83% 
of the caseload identified as Indigenous). Of the 3702 
people who received five or more eight-week penalties 
over the two years, 94.4% were Indigenous.
In its 2018 evaluation, PM&C (2018b:42) reported that:
CDP participants that identify as Indigenous 
were estimated to be 3.3 times more likely than 
other [CDP] participants to experience a penalty, 
and 2.7 times more likely to go on to experience 
a zero-rate [i.e. serious] penalty. Among those 
penalised, participants identifying as Indigenous 
were estimated to have a higher value of total 
penalties over the year ($166 higher).
3.5 Remote employment services and 
the disproportionate application of 
penalties to Indigenous Australians
In September 2017, around 12% of participants across 
all employment programs were identified as Indigenous, 
with around 24% of these (around 27 000 people) in the 
remote employment program.24 Although Indigenous 
remote program participants were few in number, the 
program had a dramatic impact on the rate of penalties 
applied to Indigenous people nationally, as shown in 
Figure 9. From the time of implementation of CDP, the 
number of penalties applied to people identified as 
Indigenous exceeded those applied to all other working-
age income support recipients (Figure 9).
Figure 10 shows that the percentage of serious penalties 
for ‘persistent noncompliance’ that were applied to 
Indigenous people was even higher, rising to more than 
70% from June 2015. On the other hand, Indigenous 
people have consistently received around 12% of the 
penalties for refusing work or ‘voluntary unemployment’, 
broadly in line with Indigenous caseload representation.
Table 2 Number of Community Development Program participants receiving one or more serious 
(8-week) failures, 1 July 2015 – 30 June 2017
Indigenous status 
Number of penalties
Total 
jobseekers1 2 3 4 5+ 
Indigenous 4 450 2 788 1 870 1 363 3 493 13 964
Non-Indigenous 498 238 126 92 209 1 163
Total 4 948 3 026 1 996 1 455 3 702 15 127
Indigenous as % of total 89.9% 92.1% 93.7% 93.7% 94.4% 92.3%
Note: Serious failures for work refusal appear to be included in these figures, but their impact on the numbers would be slight because they 
totalled 364 over the entire period.
Source: Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee Supplementary Budget Estimates 2017–18, question on notice 215
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The disproportionate application of income support 
penalties to Indigenous Australians is not new (Sanders 
1999, Eardley et al. 2005, Davidson & Whiteford 2012). 
The most detailed analysis of this issue was conducted 
by Sanders in 1999, looking at data from 1997 and 
1998 (Sanders 1999). At the time, Sanders found that 
Indigenous-identified unemployed people were 1.5 to 
2 times more likely have been breached than others, 
and made up a higher proportion of those with multiple 
breaches25 (Sanders 1999). However, in the Northern 
Territory, where nearly half of unemployment benefit 
recipients were identified as Indigenous (compared with 
5% or less in other jurisdictions), Sanders found that 
Indigenous people were penalised less often than their 
non-Indigenous counterparts (Sanders 1999:73). He 
explained that, in the Northern Territory, social security 
administrators had ‘a long and proud tradition’ of 
challenging the appropriateness of centrally developed 
rules and procedures, and ‘developing non-standard 
procedures in order to cope with Indigenous servicing 
issues’ (Sanders 1999:31). They had adopted a practice 
of applying activity test exemptions to Indigenous 
remote community residents when they considered 
the activity test inappropriate.26 This was one of a 
number of local adaptations made to accommodate the 
different cultural, social and economic circumstances 
of Indigenous people, without which, Sanders argued, a 
much higher rate of penalties would have been applied.
Twenty years on, two things stand out from Sanders’ 
analysis. The first is that, despite the passage of 
time and changes in programs and compliance 
frameworks, Indigenous people have continued to 
receive a disproportionate share of income support 
penalties. The appropriateness of income support and 
employment assistance arrangements to Indigenous 
people, particularly those living remotely, remains in 
doubt. The second is the stark contrast between the 
response of income support administrators in the late 
1990s, when considering how to tailor services to a 
remote Indigenous caseload, and decisions made more 
recently about the design of an employment service 
targeting this group. In each case, Indigenous people in 
remote communities were the specific target of policy 
action, and actions were described as addressing 
their needs. In the earlier case, this tailoring resulted 
in more secure incomes, albeit with a risk of ‘benign 
neglect’.27 In contrast, the establishment of separate 
remote employment services in 2013 has resulted in 
the application of more onerous obligations, closer 
surveillance and much higher penalties than would 
have been experienced had remote Indigenous people 
remained in the mainstream employment service.
4 Evidence of effects of 
obligations and penalties
One of the principal arguments for the application 
and enforcement of income support conditions is 
that these will lead to desired changes in behaviour 
Figure 9 Number of penalties by Indigenous status, quarters ending March 2008 – June 2018
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and, in particular, that they will increase jobseekers’ 
orientation to work (Martin 2015). Under RJCP, there 
was a degree of flexibility in both the setting of 
obligations and use of penalties, so that these could, 
in theory at least, be tailored to improve an individual’s 
job prospects. The move to a strict daily Work for 
the Dole regime from 2015 was an assertion of more 
direct behavioural control, considered necessary to 
address the ‘social dysfunction’ and ‘idleness’ that were 
considered by government officials to be widespread 
across remote Indigenous communities (Forrest 2014, 
ANAO 2017). The ‘program logic’ developed by PM&C 
for CDP proposed a causal link between an environment 
in which ‘strong compliance is enforced consistently’ 
and increased participation, and a change in attitudes 
so that ‘people in remote locations want to work’ and, 
eventually, ‘children are going to school, adults are 
working, communities are safe’ (PM&C 2018c).
In September 2017, PM&C told a Senate inquiry that 
the program was succeeding in bringing about these 
changes:
Remote job seekers are now standing up 
and participating, building daily routine and 
establishing social norms. Many remote job 
seekers have a renewed sense of pride as they are 
contributing to their communities. (PM&C 2017a:7)
However, administrative records of attendance in Work 
for the Dole do not support this claim. Figure 11 shows 
the percentage of hours of Work for the Dole that were 
actually attended during the period October 2015 to 
August 2018, as reported in the PM&C information 
technology system. Despite the application of high 
numbers of penalties during this period, actual 
attendance changed very little, averaging 40% of 
expected hours and never exceeding 50%.28
At the same time, there was a substantial decline in the 
number of people participating in remote employment 
services. On 1 July 2015, there were 36 642 people on 
the CDP caseload. By 30 June 2018, the caseload had 
dropped 17% to 30 380. Comparison of the age profile 
of remote program participants on 26 June 2015 with 
that on 29 September 2017 suggests that most of the 
caseload decline (59%) was in the under-25 age group – 
a net loss of around 2500 participants (Table 3). Another 
31% of the decline was in the 25–34-year age group 
(1314 participants). Government officials argued that this 
decline might reflect success in moving people into work, 
but the age profile of those for whom job outcomes were 
claimed did not support this view. A total of 1311 job 
outcomes were claimed for those under 25 during the 
period 1 July 2015 to 30 September 2017 – not enough 
to account for the loss of 2476 people in this age group 
from the caseload.29
Figure 10 Percentage of penalties applied to Indigenous people, quarters ending December 2010 
– June 2018
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PM&C’s evaluation of the first two years of CDP 
suggested that much of the caseload decline under CDP 
could be accounted for by population factors and the 
withdrawal of volunteers (PM&C 2018b). But it also found 
evidence of disengagement from income support by 
those on activity-tested payments at a rate higher than 
that it had been under RJCP (PM&C 2018b:29). It found 
that:
Of those participants who were penalised in the 
first quarter of 2016, an estimated six per cent 
disengaged from the income support system over 
the course of the year (to December 2016). Two in 
five of those disengaged participants were men 
under 30 years old. (PM&C 2018b:vi)
For years, there have been reports that many people in 
remote communities were not claiming income support 
for which they were eligible, but there is little evidence 
about the size and composition of this group or why 
this has occurred (Markham & Biddle 2018:7). Although 
this is a long-term issue, it has been made worse by 
CDP. There are longstanding challenges for remote 
Indigenous people in accessing or maintaining access 
Figure 11 Reports of Community Development Program hours attended, October 2015 – August 2018
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Table 3 Caseload change by age, June 2015 (RJCP) – September 2017 (CDP)
Age group (years) June 2015 September 2017 Net change
Under 25 9 848 7 372 −2 476
25–34 9 665 8 351 −1 314
35–44 8 066 7 132 −934
45–54 5 890 5 929 +39
55–64 3 279 3 768 +489
65 and over 55 77 +22
Total 36 803 32 629 −4 174
Source: Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee, supplementary estimates, 19–23 October 2015, question on notice 
reference 143; Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee, additional budget estimates 2017–18, question on notice 
reference PM133
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to income support because of the inadequacy and 
inappropriateness of DHS services (e.g. Commonwealth 
Ombudsman 2016, Kral 2017, NAAJA 2017), but there 
is also evidence that some remote Indigenous people 
are absenting themselves from Work for the Dole 
because they reject the imposition of obligations under 
CDP. In 2014–17, a series of interviews were conducted 
with remote program participants, provider staff and 
community members as part of a research project 
looking at the development and implementation of 
remote employment services.30 In the course of these 
interviews, participants expressed the view that the 
program was illegitimate, and a vehicle for control by a 
white government:
Since European settlement white people have 
been telling us what to do. They are used to 
telling Aboriginal people what to do. (CDP 
participant)
Q: What are the good things about Work for the 
Dole?
A: Nothing good, work for the dole. That’s rubbish 
work. That hurts so much when people say you 
are on work for dole. This Government’s rules. 
Government laws. Got to do the job for him. (CDP 
participant)
Some contrasted the program with the earlier CDEP 
program in which people worked for their own 
community:
Our people don’t like this. Want to work for real 
money. If they had real money, then more people 
would be involved. They come and go [from 
activities] because its Centrelink…Especially 
Work for the Dole – it look like they lost a bit of 
their skins. Because they lost CDEP. It’s been 
a long time now. That’s what everyone in the 
community say. (Indigenous male supervisor)
Although some refused to comply with obligations or 
withdrew from income support, more often resistance 
was less overt. Many people prioritised other things over 
compliance with Work for the Dole rules, returning when 
the cost of doing so became too great – such as the 
man who explained that he had been helping his sick 
wife look after their child, but had to tell her ‘you have 
to do it now’ so he could go back to picking up rubbish 
and ‘earn’ his income support.31
5 A new Targeted 
Compliance Framework
In early 2018, the Australian Government secured the 
passage of the Social Services Legislation Amendment 
(Welfare Reform) Act 2018, replacing the 2009 Job 
Seeker Compliance Framework with a new Targeted 
Compliance Framework (TCF) from 1 July 2018. When 
it tabled the proposed legislation in parliament, the 
government announced that it would exclude CDP 
participants from the TCF so that it could develop ‘a 
more appropriate model’ for remote Australia (PM&C 
2017b). Even so, in May 2018, only weeks after the 
passage of the legislation, the government reversed 
its position and announced that it intended to apply 
the new TCF to CDP participants from February 2019 
(Scullion 2018).
The TCF introduces a new system of demerit points 
in place of short penalties. These are applied by 
providers without DHS involvement. After six demerits 
have been accrued, jobseekers are referred to DHS 
for an assessment (similar to a CCA) and, if found to 
be capable of meeting their obligations, move into the 
‘penalty zone’. Once in this zone, the first failure attracts 
a one-week penalty, the second attracts a two-week 
penalty, and the third results in benefit cancellation 
with a four-week reapplication preclusion period. 
These penalties cannot be waived or worked off, and 
participants remain in the penalty zone, continuing to 
receive penalties for each compliance failure, until and 
unless they remain fully compliant for three months. The 
framework reduces DHS involvement in investigating the 
first six minor failures, generating significant operational 
savings. Its stated aim is to ‘focus resources and 
penalties on jobseekers who persistently and wilfully 
do not meet requirements’, while encouraging those 
who generally meet their requirements to re-engage 
through use of suspensions (Department of Jobs and 
Small Business 2018). Jobseekers who are assessed as 
capable of self-reporting must now do so online, using 
a smartphone application to track their mandatory job 
searches and accrued demerit points. According to the 
government:
This will give jobseekers more complete control 
over their return to work journey and will help to 
develop more work-like behaviours. (Department 
of Jobs and Small Business 2018:5)
However, in December 2018, the peak body 
representing nonprofit employment services providers 
wrote to the government to raise concerns about 
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the way that TCF was affecting sole parents, citing 
examples of people having been suspended because 
they did not have a smartphone, or access to data 
(Henriques-Gomes 2018).
At the time the TCF was being debated, the Australian 
Government Department of Employment32 estimated 
that there were around 40 000 people in jobactive who 
were likely to receive harsher penalties under the TCF. 
These were participants who had repeatedly missed 
appointments and had no recorded ‘capability issues’.33 
Of this group, 25% were identified as Indigenous, 
2.5 times their representation on the caseload. Had CDP 
participants been included in this estimate, the negative 
impact on Indigenous people would have been much 
more pronounced. During 2017, when the TCF was 
proposed, Indigenous jobseekers in the CDP made up 
72% of those who received persistent noncompliance 
penalties, placing them squarely in the group targeted 
under the TCF. The Australian Government’s exclusion 
of CDP participants while the TCF was being considered 
meant that its impact on Indigenous people barely 
surfaced as an issue. It was not mentioned at all in the 
report of the Senate committee that inquired into the Bill 
(SCALC 2017).
The TCF widens the gap in treatment of those who 
take ‘personal responsibility’ for compliance and 
those who are assessed as ‘wilfully and persistently 
noncompliant’. Surveillance of the former is becoming 
increasingly automated, with jobseekers expected to 
report on their own compliance. The shrinking resources 
of an increasingly punitive DHS bureaucracy are being 
concentrated on those considered recalcitrant.
In August 2018, Minister Scullion tabled a Bill that 
would apply the TCF to CDP participants, attracting 
widespread opposition from providers and the wider 
Indigenous sector (SCALC 2018). The minister explained 
that, under the legislation, the number of penalties 
would decrease and that ‘without this legislation, CDP 
participants will continue to be subject to a different 
compliance model than the rest of Australia’.34 But the 
modelling of the TCF that he later tabled in the Senate 
showed that, by the second year of its implementation, 
the TCF would mean many more days lost in income 
support penalties, and nearly 8000 instances of 
cancellation of benefits (Fowkes 2018ab).
6 Conclusion
Since the decision to establish a separate remote 
employment service in 2012, decisions about its design 
have been justified on the basis of a need to respond to 
the unique circumstances of remote Australia, and, in 
particular, the needs of remote Indigenous communities. 
In the past, attention to the particular needs and 
circumstances of remote Indigenous Australians gave 
rise to system adaptations such as CDEP and RAEs. 
These adaptations operated at the margins of the 
welfare system, making it more ‘workable’ in remote 
settings, while leaving intact its core structures and 
assumptions – such as the obligation to work. Over the 
past 30 years, however, successive governments have 
sought to bring more groups into the labour market, 
while applying pressure on them to take up increasingly 
precarious and low-paid work. Employment assistance, 
including both the benefits system and labour market 
programs:
… are constructed to provide the poor with an 
experience of market incentives and logics and to 
teach self-discipline to workers who are expected 
to adapt to their plight on the lower rungs of the 
labor market. (Schram et al. 2010:745)
One of the ways in which this disciplinary project unfolds 
is through the identification of different groups of people 
as more or less capable of self-discipline – of quickly 
sorting those who can be expected to find employment 
from those who need closer direction to learn how 
to work (Dean 2002, McDonald et al. 2003). This 
sorting can be seen within the structure of mainstream 
employment services – in the assignment of only longer-
term unemployed people to Work for the Dole, in new 
arrangements for the ‘job ready’ to manage their own 
compliance through online reporting, and in increased 
penalties for those who are found to be ‘persistently 
noncompliant’. Within remote employment services, 
there is less internal sorting. All participants are treated 
as ‘risky’. Surveillance is broadly and intensively 
applied. The resurgence in paternalist approaches to 
those ‘hardest to help’ in the wider welfare system has 
coincided, in remote areas, with the renewed dominance 
of paternalism in Indigenous affairs.
The effects of more onerous conditions and increasingly 
intensive surveillance have been an extraordinary 
increase in income support penalties and increased 
disengagement of Indigenous people from the system. 
The adverse effects on Indigenous people are so 
evident, and so extreme, that it appears that the 
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program will not survive in its current form. In January 
2019, Minister Scullion announced that, while the TCF 
will be applied to remote participants, changes to Work 
for the Dole arrangements will act to reduce penalties 
(Scullion 2019).35 The Labor opposition has announced 
that, should it win office, it will abolish CDP altogether, 
replacing it with a new scheme. These measures will 
not, on their own, resolve the underlying dilemmas in 
providing income support and labour market assistance 
in remote communities. Years of underinvestment in 
remote education, health, housing and other services 
will continue to disadvantage those who try to obtain 
support. More fundamentally, Australia’s welfare 
system is structured around the central importance of 
undertaking paid work and the civic duty to do so. To 
the extent that this objective remains elusive for, or that 
it may not be shared by, Indigenous people, our welfare 
institutions will continue to marginalise and exclude 
many Indigenous Australians.
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Appendix
Table A Source of CDP participant obligations and penalties
Social security legislation (Job Seeker 
Compliance Framework) CDP funding deed and guidelines
Obligations Describes which categories of payment are 
subject to an activity test
Describes what activities must be put into 
individual job plans (e.g. monthly appointments, 
Work for Dole, job search) for different groups in 
the program to satisfy the activity test
Says that work capacity must be taken into 
account 
Attaches specific obligations to different levels 
of capacity (e.g. number of hours for those with 
reduced work capacity)
Places upper limit on hours that unemployed 
can be required to participate (25 hours 
per week) and limits the type of mandatory 
activity (e.g. cannot be required to undergo 
medical treatment)
Describes how many hours different people in 
the CDP scheme must participate in Work for 
the Dole (within legislated limit) and what choice 
of activities they will have
Describes under what circumstances 
participants can or must be exempted from 
activity test (e.g. cultural activity)
Sets requirements for daily (Monday to Friday) 
Work for the Dole and number of weeks each 
year to be worked 
Defines ‘reasonable excuse’ for 
nonattendance (in regulations)
Not applicable
Penalties Sets circumstances in which people may be 
penalised, and rate of penalty
Requires providers to report daily on 
attendance in the IT system; links payment to 
recommending penalties for nonattendance
Sets out appeal rights Not applicable
Payments Establishes income support payment rates 
and frequency (normally fortnightly, but can 
be weekly)
Not applicable
CDP = Community Development Program; IT = information technology
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Notes
1. Identified in DHS systems. Income support 
applicants are asked to self-identify voluntarily when 
they apply. 
2. Work for the Dole is a mandatory period of ‘work’ 
under supervision for a fixed period of hours. In 
nonremote areas the work must be in a nonprofit 
organisation, but, since 2015, those in remote 
areas can be required to work in private sector 
organisations and in jobs ordinarily done by paid 
workers. 
3. Often referred to as Centrelink.
4. Although the Department of Jobs and Small 
Business has primary responsibility for policy in 
relation to compliance, PM&C is the policy agency 
for remote employment services (ANAO 2017:18–19). 
5. Key changes from JSA to jobactive included an 
increase in the expected number of job searches, 
reduced emphasis on training and education, and 
increased weighting of fees attached to employment 
outcomes as opposed to service provision.
6. These included amendments in the CDP Bill 2015, 
tabled in December 2015 which lapsed because of 
lack of support, and proposals put forward in a 2017 
discussion paper (PM&C 2017c). 
7. Suspensions have not been included in this analysis.
8. http://guides.dss.gov.au/guide-social-security-
law/3/1/13/70, accessed 10 October 2018.
9. Published by the Department of Jobs and Small 
Business at https://www.jobs.gov.au/job-seeker-
compliance-data.
10. Senate Finance and Public Administration Legislation 
Committee, additional budget estimates 2017–18, 
answer to question on notice reference PM133. 
Caseload at 29 September 2017.
11. Department of Jobs and Small Business, jobactive 
caseload by selected cohorts time series, available 
at http://lmip.gov.au/default.aspx?LMIP/Downloads/
EmploymentRegion, downloaded 8 October 2018. 
Caseload at 30 September 2017.
12. In remote areas, people with disabilities 
were referred to CDP. Department of Jobs 
and Small Business, Disability Employment 
Services monthly data, available at http://
lmip.gov.au/default.aspx?LMIP/Downloads/
DisabilityEmploymentServicesData/MonthlyData. 
Caseload at 30 September 2017.
13. Refer to Davidson and Whiteford (2012) for historical 
penalties data. 
14. The change from RJCP to CDP was given effect 
through amendments to the RJCP funding deed. 
In most cases, existing providers accepted the 
amendments and continued to deliver the program. 
15. Senate Standing Committee on Education and 
Employment, budget estimates 2017–18, question on 
notice reference EMSQ17-004072.
16. From 1 July 2015 providers could, in addition to 
triggering a payment suspension, recommend that a 
financial penalty be applied where an appointment 
had not been attended.
17. Senate Standing Committee on Education and 
Employment, additional budget estimates 2016–17, 
question on notice reference EMSQ17-001953.
18. Senate Standing Committee on Education 
and Employment, supplementary budget 
estimates 2017–18, question on notice reference 
EMSQ17-004468.
19. Senate Finance and Public Administration Legislation 
Committee, additional budget estimates 2017–18, 
question on notice reference PM133. 
20. Senate Standing Committee on Education and 
Employment, budget estimates 2017–18, question 
on notice reference EMSQ17-004084.
21. Estimate based on 75% of the Australian National 
Audit Office estimate of CDP caseload for 2016–17 
(ANAO 2017:41).
22. Senate Finance and Public Administration 
Committee, additional budget estimates 2016–17, 
question on notice reference PM99.
23. Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee, 
budget estimates 2018–19, question on notice 
reference HS65 SQ18-000128.
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24. Senate Finance and Public Administration Legislation 
Committee, additional budget estimates 2017–18, 
question on notice reference PM133 (caseload at 29 
September 2017); jobactive caseload by selected 
cohorts time series data (caseload at 30 September 
2017); Disability Employment Services cohort data 
(31 December 2017).
25. A breach refers to a finding that the jobseeker has 
failed to meet their obligations. Sanders notes 
that not all breaches resulted in the application of 
penalties, as the original decision maker was able 
to overturn the breach, and often did so (Sanders 
1999:6).
26. In applying these exemptions, the legislation allowed 
officials to take into account the location of offices, 
‘difficulties with transport and communication and 
the educational and cultural background of the 
person’ (Sanders 1999:31) 
27. Sanders notes that the use of RAEs in the Northern 
Territory risked neglect of those who might have 
some employment prospects (Sanders 1999:118). 
28. PM&C’s evaluation of CDP reports that from January 
2016 to July 2017 ‘the proportion who attended 
(including partial attendance) fluctuated between 40 
and 50 per cent’ (PM&C 2018b:19). 
29. Senate Finance and Public Administration 
Committee, additional budget estimates 2017–18, 
question on notice reference PM134. Note that, in 
any event, it would normally be expected that many 
of those who left the caseload for education or 
employment would be replaced by people entering 
or re-entering the workforce,
30. This project, led by Dr Will Sanders and funded by 
the Australian Research Council and Jobs Australia, 
started in 2013 (Linkage Project No. 130100226). 
31. Similar findings are reported in the report 
commissioned by PM&C and released in February 
2019 (see PM&C 2018c). 
32. Now called Department of Jobs and Small Business.
33. Senate Standing Committee on Education and 
Employment, budget estimates 2017–18, question on 
notice reference EMSQ17-004270.
34. Second reading speech, Social Security Legislation 
Amendment (Community Development Program) Bill 
2018 (the CDP Bill), 18 October 2018.
35. The measures include reduction of weekly Work for 
the Dole hours from 25 to 20, increased flexibility in 
scheduling and a change to the funding model to 
remove the incentive to penalise. They are due to 
take effect on 1 March 2019. 
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